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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of temporal
anaphora in sentences which contain quan-
tification over events, within the frame-
work of Discourse Representation Theory.
The analysis in (Partee, 1984) of quantified
sentences, introduced by a temporal con-
nective, gives the wrong truth-conditions
when the temporal connective in the subor-
dinate clause is before or after. This prob-
lem has been previously analyzed in (de
Swart, 1991) as an instance of the propor-
tion problem, and given a solution from a
Generalized Quantifier approach. By using
a careful distinction between the different
notions of reference time, based on (Kamp
and Reyle, 1993), we propose a solution
to this problem, within the framework of
DRT. We show some applications of this
solution to additional temporal anaphora
phenomena in quantified sentences.
1 Introduction
The analysis of temporal expressions in natural lan-
guage discourse provides a challenge for contempo-
rary semantic theories. (Partee, 1973) introduced
the notion of temporal anaphora, to account for ways
in which temporal expressions depend on surround-
ing elements in the discourse for their semantic con-
tribution to the discourse. In this paper, we discuss
the interaction of temporal anaphora and quantifi-
cation over eventualities. Such interaction, while in-
teresting in its own right, is also a good test-bed for
theories of the semantic interpretation of temporal
expressions. We discuss cases such as:
(1) Before John makes a phone call, he always
lights up a cigarette. (Partee, 1984)
(2) Often, when Anne came home late, Paul had
already prepared dinner. (de Swart, 1991)
(3) When he came home, he always switched on the
tv. He took a beer and sat down in his armchair
to forget the day. (de Swart, 1991)
(4) When John is at the beach, he always squints
when the sun is shining. (de Swart, 1991)
The analysis of sentences such as (1) in (Partee,
1984), within the framework of Discourse Represen-
tation Theory (DRT) (Kamp, 1981) gives the wrong
truth-conditions, when the temporal connective in
the sentence is before or after. In DRT, such sen-
tences trigger box-splitting with the eventuality of
the subordinate clause and an updated reference
time in the antecedent box, and the eventuality of
the main clause in the consequent box, causing un-
desirable universal quantification over the reference
time.
This problem is analyzed in (de Swart, 1991) as
an instance of the proportion problem and given a so-
lution from a Generalized Quantifier approach. We
were led to seek a solution for this problem within
DRT, because of DRT’s advantages as a general
theory of discourse, and its choice as the underly-
ing formalism in another research project of ours,
which deals with sentences such as 1–4, in the con-
text of natural language specifications of computer-
ized systems. In this paper, we propose such a solu-
tion, based on a careful distinction between different
roles of Reichenbach’s reference time (Reichenbach,
1947), adapted from (Kamp and Reyle, 1993). Fig-
ure 1 shows a ‘minimal pair’ of DRS’s for sentence 1,
one according to Partee’s(1984) analysis and one ac-
cording to ours.
2 Background
An analysis of the mechanism of temporal anaphoric
reference hinges upon an understanding of the onto-
logical and logical foundations of temporal reference.
nx r0
John(x)
e1 r1
e1 ⊆ r0 r1 < e1
e1: x phone
⇒
e2
e2 ⊆ r1
e2: x light up
nx s
John(x) n ⊆ s
s:
e t
t = loc(e)
e: x phone
⇒
e′ t′
t′ < t e′ ⊆ t′
e′: x light up
Figure 1: a:Partee’s analysis b:Our analysis
Different concepts have been used in the literature
as primitives. These range from temporal instants
in Tense logic (Prior, 67), through intervals of time
(Bennet and Partee, 1978(1972)) as in the analy-
sis of temporal connectives in (Heina¨ma¨ki, 1978), to
event structures (Kamp, 1979) as in Hinrichs’ (1986)
analysis of temporal anaphora.
An important factor in the interpretation of tem-
poral expressions is the classification of situations
into different aspectual classes (or Aktionsarten),
which is based on distributional and semantic prop-
erties. In this paper, we only consider events and
states, together termed eventualities in (Bach, 1981).
In narrative sequences, event clauses seem to ad-
vance the narrative time, while states block its pro-
gression. The mechanism used to account for this
phenomena in (Hinrichs, 1986) and (Partee, 1984),
is based on the notion of reference time, originally
proposed by Reichenbach (1947).
Reichenbach’s well - known account of the inter-
pretation of the different tense forms uses the tem-
poral relations between three temporal indices: the
utterance time, event time and reference time. The
reference time according to (Reichenbach, 1947) is
determined either by context, or by temporal adver-
bials.
2.1 A unified analysis of temporal
anaphora
Hinrichs’ and Partee’s use of a notion of reference
time, provides for a unified treatment of temporal
anaphoric relations in discourse, which include nar-
rative progression especially in sequences of simple
past tense sentences, temporal adverbs and tempo-
ral adverbial clauses, introduced by a temporal con-
nective. This concept of reference time is no longer
an instant of time, but rather, an interval. This ap-
proach can be summarized as follows: in the process-
ing of a discourse, the discourse-initial sentence is
argued to require some contextually determined ref-
erence time. Further event clauses in the discourse
introduce a new event, which is included within the
then-current reference time. Each such event also
causes the reference time to be updated to a time
‘just after’ (Partee, 1984) this event. State clauses
introduce new states, which include the current ref-
erence time, and do not update it.
As an example of such an analysis consider the
following narrative discourse (Partee, 1984):
(5) John got up, went to the window, and raised the
blind. It was light out. He pulled the blind down
and went back to bed. He wasn’t ready to face
the day. He was too depressed.
Figure 2 shows a DRS for the first two sentences
of this discourse, according to Hinrichs’ and Partee’s
analysis. The ‘n’ in the top DRS is a mnemonic for
‘now’- the utterance time. The first event in the
discourse, e1 – John’s getting up – is interpreted rel-
ative to a contextually understood reference time,
r0. The event e1 is included in the current reference
time, r0. A new reference time marker, r1 is then
introduced. r1 lies immediately after r0 (recorded as
r0  r1). r1 serves as the current reference time for
the following event e2. We continue in this fashion,
updating the reference time, until the second sen-
tence in the discourse is processed. This sentence
denotes a state, s1, which includes the then-current
reference time.
r0 e1 r1 e2 r2 e3 s1 n
r0 < n e1 ⊆ r0 r0  r1
r1 < n e2 ⊆ r1 r1  r2
r2 < n e3 ⊆ r2 r2 ⊆ s1
e1: John get up
e2: . . .
Figure 2:
Adverbial phrases, whether phrasal (e.g. ‘On Sun-
day’) or clausal (e.g. ‘When Bill left’), are processed
before the main clause. They introduce a reference
time, which overrides the current reference time, and
✚✙
✛✘
✚✙
✛✘
✚✙
✛✘r0 r2
eturn r1 esee ecross≤ < ≤ ≤ ≤ r4ehurry
r3
Figure 3:
provides an anaphoric antecedent for the tense in
the main clause. This mechanism is used to ex-
plain how tense and temporal adverbials can com-
bine to temporally locate the occurrence, without
running into problems of relative scope (Hinrichs,
1988). The tense morpheme of the main clause lo-
cates the event time with respect to the reference
time, whereas temporal adverbials are used to lo-
cate the reference time.
When-clauses, for example, introduce a new ref-
erence time, which is ordered after the events de-
scribed in the preceding discourse. The eventuality
in the when-clause is related to this reference time
as discussed earlier with respect to narrative pro-
gression: a state includes its reference time, while
an event is included in it. The eventuality in the
main clause is interpreted with respect to this ref-
erence time. If the main clause is an event-clause,
this event introduces a new reference time, just after
the event time of the main clause. As an example,
consider the following discourse (Partee, 1984):
(6) Mary turned the corner. When John saw her, she
crossed the street. She hurried into a store.
Following Partee (1984), we will not construct a
full DRS for this discourse, but illustrate it with a
diagram in Figure 3, with circles denoting inclusion.
2.2 Quantification over events
(Partee, 1984) extends Hinrichs’ treatment of tem-
poral anaphora to the analysis of sentences, which
contain a temporal adverbial and quantification over
eventualities. According to her analysis, these trig-
ger box-splitting as do if or every clauses in DRT
(Kamp, 1981). Consider the following example from
(Partee, 1984):
(7) Whenever Mary telephoned, Sam was asleep.
The subordinate clause cannot be interpreted rel-
ative to a single reference time, since Mary’s tele-
phoning is not specified to occur at some specific
time. Still, the sentence needs to be interpreted rel-
ative to a reference time. This reference time can be
a large interval, and should contain each of the rele-
vant occurrences of Mary’s telephoning during which
nx y r0
Mary(y)
Sam(x)
ւ
e1 r1
e1 ⊆ r0 e1 < n
e1  r1 r1 < n
e1: y telephone
⇒
s1
r1 ⊆ s1
s1: x sleep
Figure 4:
Bill was asleep. This reference time is represented
as r0 in the top sub-DRS.
The ‘whenever’ triggers box-splitting. The event
marker - e1 is introduced in the antecedent box, with
the condition that it be temporally included in the
current reference time, r0 and be prior to n. The
‘whenever’ also causes the introduction of r1, a new
reference time marker. r1 lies ‘just after’ e1. The
stative clause causes the introduction of s1, which
includes the reference time r1.
The embedding conditions for the whole construc-
tion are just like those for a regular ‘if ’ or ‘every’
clause, i.e. the sentence is true, if every proper em-
bedding of the antecedent box can be extended to
a proper embedding of the combination of the an-
tecedent and the consequent boxes. This means,
as desired, that for each choice of an event e1 of
Mary’s telephoning, and reference time r1 ‘just af-
ter’ it, there is a state of Sam’s being asleep, that
surrounds r1.
A sentence such as (7a) which is the same as sen-
tence 7, except the ‘whenever’ is replaced by ‘when’,
and ‘always’ is added in the main clause, would get
the same DRS.
(7a) When Mary telephoned, Sam was always asleep.
2.3 Extending the analysis
As noted in (Partee, 1984), this analysis does not ex-
tend in a straightforward manner to cases in which
the operator when is replaced by (an unrestricted)
before or after, in such quantified contexts. Con-
structing a similar DRS for such sentences gives the
wrong truth conditions. For example, Figure 1a
shows a DRS for sentence 1, according to the prin-
ciples above. r1 - the reference time, used for the
interpretation of the main clause is placed in the
universe of the antecedent box. Because the tempo-
ral connective is ‘before’, r1 is restricted to lie before
e1. The embedding conditions determine, that this
reference time be universally quantified over, caus-
ing an erroneous reading in which for each event, e1,
of John’s calling, for each earlier time r1, he lights
up a cigarette. Paraphrasing this, we could say that
John lights up cigarettes at all times preceding each
phone call, not just once preceding each phone call.
We did not encounter this problem in the DRS in
Figure 4, since although the reference time r1, is uni-
versally quantified over in that DRS as well, it is also
restricted, to immediately follow e1. It is similarly
restricted if ‘before’ is replaced with ‘just before’ or
‘ten minutes before’. But, (unrestricted) ‘before’ is
analyzed as ‘some time before’, and thus the prob-
lem arises. We will henceforth informally refer to
this problem as Partee’s quantification problem.
Partee (1984) suggests that in these cases we
somehow have to insure that the reference time,
r1, appears in the universe of the consequent DRS,
causing it to be existentially quantified over, giving
the desired interpretation. De Swart (1991) notes
that simply moving r1 to the right-hand box does
not agree with Hinrichs’ assumption, that tempo-
ral clauses are processed before the main clause,
since they update the reference time, with respect
to which the main clause will be interpreted. In
our proposed solution, the ‘reference time’ is indeed
moved to the right box, but it is a different notion of
reference time, and (as will be shown) exempt from
this criticism.
3 The proportion problem
De Swart (1991) sees Partee’s quantification problem
as a temporal manifestation of the proportion prob-
lem, which arises in cases such as (Kadmon, 1990):
(8) Most women who own a cat are happy.
The sentence is false in the case where out of ten
women, one owns 50 cats and is happy, while the
other nine women own only one cat each, and are
miserable. This will not be predicted by the unse-
lective binding of quantifiers in DRT, which quan-
tify over all the free variables in their scope, in this
case women-cat pairs. According to (de Swart, 1991)
Partee’s quantification problem is similar - the uni-
versal quantifier in sentences such as (1) binds pairs
of events and updated reference times, where the
desired quantificational scheme is universal quantifi-
cation for the event and existential for the reference
time.
De Swart (1991) offers a solution from a Gener-
alized Quantifier approach, based on the analysis of
quantified NPs in transitive sentences. In this anal-
ysis, the reference time is an implicit variable, which
is needed in the interpretation of the temporal rela-
tion, but is not part of the quantificational structure.
Temporal connectives are viewed as relations, TC,
between two sets of events:
(9) {< e1, e2 > | < e1, e2 >∈ TC}
The quantificational structure of such sentences
can be analyzed either by an iteration of monadic
quantifiers, or as a single dyadic quantifier of type
< 1, 1, 2 >. In the first approach, adverbs of quan-
tification (Q-adverbs) are assigned the structure:
(10) Q(Ss, {e1|∃(Sm, TCe1)})
In 10, Ss and Sm denote, respectively, the sets of
events described by the subordinate and the main
clause, TCe1 denotes the image set of e1 under the
temporal connective TC, i.e. the set of events e2
which are related to e1 via the relation TC, (pre-
sented in 9). In the second approach, the structure
is:
(11) [Q, ∃](Ss, Sm, TC)
De Swart’s solution does overcome Partee’s quan-
tification problem, although not within DRT. As
such, the existential quantification in 11 has to be
stipulated, whereas our analysis acquires this exis-
tential quantification ‘for free’.
4 Splitting the role of reference time
Our analysis of Partee’s quantification problem uses
a different notion of reference time than that used
by the accounts in the exposition above. Follow-
ing (Kamp and Reyle, 1993), we split the role of
the reference time, used to account for a large ar-
ray of phenomena, into several independent mech-
anisms. This separation allows for an analysis in
DRT of temporal subordinate clauses in quantified
sentences, which avoids Partee’s problem altogether.
The mechanisms we discuss are: the location time,
Rpt and perf1. DRSs will contain temporal mark-
ers corresponding to location times and Rpts.
The location time is an interval, used to tempo-
rally locate eventualities, in accordance with their
aspectual classification. Events are included in their
location time (recorded in the DRS as e ⊆ t on the
respective markers), while states temporally overlap
their location time (recorded as s© t). The verb
tense determines the relation between the location
time and the utterance time e.g. if the tense is simple
1An additional mechanism is the TPpt, which for
simplicity’s sake will not be discussed in this paper.
past, the location time lies anteriorly to the utter-
ance time. When it is simple present, the location
time coincides with the utterance time2. Tempo-
ral adverbials restrict the location time: temporal
adverbs introduce a DRS-condition on the location
time, while temporal subordinate clauses introduce a
relation between the event time3 of the subordinate
clause and the location time of the main clause. The
exact temporal relation denoted by a temporal con-
nective depends on the aspectual classes of the even-
tualities related by it4. For example, in the following
sentence 12, the event triggers the introduction of an
event marker e, and location time marker t, into the
DRS with the DRS-condition e ⊆ t. The past tense
of the verb adds the condition t < n. In sentence 13,
the location time of the event in the main clause is
restricted to fall (just) after the event time of the
event of the subordinate clause.
(12) Mary wrote the letter.
(13) Mary wrote the letter when Bill left.
Narrative progression is dealt with by using the
feature Rpt (or reference point). The Rpt can
be either an event or a time discourse marker, al-
ready present in the DRS (recorded as assignment
Rpt := e). Eventualities are interpreted with respect
to the Rpt - events are taken to follow the current
Rpt, while states include it. The Rpt is reset during
the processing of the discourse. Note that in a ‘ter-
minal’ DRS (ready for an embedding test), all the
auxiliary Rpts ‘disappear’ (do not participate in the
embedding).
The perfect is analyzed by using the notion of a
nucleus (Moens and Steedman, 1988) to account for
the inner structure of an eventuality. A nucleus is de-
fined as a structure containing a preparatory process,
culmination and consequent state. The categoriza-
tion of verb phrases into different aspectual classes
can be phrased in terms of which part of the nucleus
they refer to. The perfect is seen in (Kamp and
Reyle, 1993) as an aspectual operator. The even-
tualities described by the perfect of a verb refer to
2Since the utterance time, n is a point in (Kamp and
Reyle, 1993), the overlap relation between a state that
holds in the present and n reduces to inclusion.
3The event time t of an eventuality e is the smallest
interval which includes e (recorded as t = loc(e)).
4For the sake of the current presentation, we assume
the following relations for When: if both the when-clause
and the main clause denote states, then their respective
time indices overlap. If both are events then the times
are temporally close, with the exact relation undeter-
mined. When one is a state and one an event, then
the time index of the state includes that of the event cf.
(Hinrichs, 1986).
the consequent state of its nucleus. For example, the
following sentence 14 denotes the state, s, holding at
the present, that Mary has met the president. This
state is a result of the event e, in which Mary met
the president. Temporally, the state s starts just
when e ends, or as it is put in (Kamp and Reyle,
1993):e and s abut, (represented as e ⊃⊂s).
(14) Mary has met the president.
5 An alternative solution
By extending the analysis of temporal subordinate
clauses in (Kamp and Reyle, 1993), to sentences
which include quantification over eventualities, we
can propose an alternative DRT solution to Partee’s
quantification problem. As in (Partee, 1984), such
sentences trigger box-splitting. But now, the loca-
tion time of the eventuality in the subordinate clause
serves as the antecedent for the location time of the
eventuality in the main clause. In this approach,
each of the relevant temporal markers resides in
its appropriate box, yielding the correct quantifica-
tional structure. This quantification structure does
not need to be stipulated as part of the Q-adverb’s
meaning, but arises directly from the temporal sys-
tem. We illustrate this analysis by constructing a
DRS in Figure 1b for sentence 1.
In this DRS, n denotes the utterance time. The
subordinate clause triggers the introduction of an
event marker, e, with its event time marker t. The
main clause triggers the introduction of an event
marker e′, and its location time marker t′, with the
DRS-condition e′ ⊆ t′. The assymetry in using the
event time for e and the location time for e′ arises
from the interpretation rules of temporal connectives
(for both quantified and non-quantified sentences).
Since the temporal connective in this sentence is be-
fore, the relation between these two markers is one
of precedence.
We adopt a suggestion by Chierchia in (Partee,
1984), that the whole implication be rendered as a
state. This state is no longer an atomic eventuality.
It is a complex state denoting John’s habit. This
state holds during the present, and so its location
time is n.
This solution is not prone to de Swart’s (1991)
criticism against the naive solution of moving the ref-
erence time to the right DRS. The temporal clause
may be processed before the main clause, since t′,
the location time of e′, which ‘replaces’ r1, the refer-
ence time of Partee’s analysis, as the temporal index
of the eventuality in the the main clause, arises from
processing the main clause (not updating the refer-
ence time of the subordinate clause).
6 Additional phenomena
In this section we present some applications of our
analysis to related constructions. First, we consider
the past perfect, as in sentence 2. De Swart (1991)
gives this example to illustrate the inability to in-
terpret temporal connectives without the use of the
reference times. According to (de Swart, 1991), the
subordinate clause determines the reference time of
the verb, which lies anteriorly to the event time.
Trying to use the event times would give the wrong
analysis. This would seem to be troublesome for our
approach, which uses the location time of the event
in the main clause, and not its reference time. How-
ever, this is not a problem, since our analysis of the
perfect by the use of the operator perf, analyses the
eventuality referred to by the main clause, as the
result state of a previous event. The temporal rela-
tion in the sentence is inclusion between the event
time of Anne’s coming home, and the location time
of the result state of Paul’s already having prepared
dinner.
Next, we consider narrative progression in quan-
tified contexts, as in sentence 3. The basic construc-
tion is just the same as in the paradigm structure,
but now we have narrative progression in the conse-
quent box. This narrative progression is handled as
ordinary narrative progression in (Kamp and Reyle,
1993), i.e. by resetting the Rpt. The DRS in Fig-
ure 5 describes the complex state s1, that after each
event of John’s coming home, there is a sequence of
subsequent events according to his activities.
nx s1 t1
s1 © t1 t1 < n
s1:
e1 t2
t2 = loc(e1)
e1: x c.h.
⇒
e2 e3 e4 t3 t4 t5
e2 ⊆ t3 t2 < t3
e2:x sw. on tv
Rpt := e2
e3 ⊆ t4 e2 < e3
e3: x take beer
Rpt := e3
e4 ⊆ t4 e3 < e4
e4: . . .
Figure 5:
Finally, we deal with sentences such as (4), which
contain an iteration of an implicit generic quantifier
and always. The situation described by John’s al-
ways squinting when the sun is shining is analyzed
as a complex state s3. This state holds whenever
John is at the beach, recorded by the condition that
the location time t2 of s3 overlaps the event time, t1
of John’s being at the beach, s2 in Figure 6.
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